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1. Introduction.
In order for machines to do Mathematics what is required first of all is a language that describes
Mathematics in adequate terms for machines. This language has to be completely formalised and
without any semantic ambiguity. Computers cannot make operational choices as a function of the
meaning of a phrase, especially if it is uncertain or depends on the context, but only on analysing its
syntactic structure. Furthermore, the language has to be sufficiently simple, even if artificial, and
comprehensible by the human programmer.
There are two main approaches to making computers do Mathematics. On the one hand, the
studies of ‘computation’ systems, that is the study of languages and techniques that aid algebrists or
analysts in ‘calculating’ what would otherwise be arduous or out of reach for a human being. On
the other hand, the development of languages that replace or complement the logical and deductive
activity of a mathematician (automatic proof and symbolic calculus). In this exposition, we will
present, in a very informal manner, the second approach, with the particular point of view, which is
important or at least paradigmatic, of logical and functional computations that are grouped under the
name ‘l-calculus’. We will especially see the linguistic aspect of the problem  of  elaborating  a
language to perform deductions and  manipulate  symbols,  and  more  generally  to  program  in  a
rigorous, modular and translatable manner. Indeed, the ability to conceive advanced languages and
reliable programs is the principal objective of the ‘relation’ we will describe, between machines and
mathematical proofs, and it is also the reason for this paper.
Let us observe to begin with, that if today the existence of machines encourages the development
of automatic proofs and of symbolic  calculi,  it  can  also  be  stated  that  the  basic  ideas  for  the
conception of modern computers is found in the study of proofs, as abstract human activity. The
notion of effective computation and languages of which we will speak dates from the twenties and
thirties, that is well in advance of numerical computers and formed an integral part of the Hilbertian
Proof Theory, that is of the project to formalise  mathematical  deduction,  and  answer  Hilbert's
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fondational problem. The goal was to give rigor or logico-formal foundations to all mathematical
activities.
In spite of the failures of the Hilbert's initial project, the ideas of logicians and mathematicians
like Turing, Kleene, Church, Gödel,  Herbrand...  set  the  bases  for  Computer  Science.  Turing
Machines, later developed also by Von Neumann, have formed the paradigm of the first computers
and of languages known as imperative programming (based on orders like ‘do’, ‘go to’...). The
formal  systems  for  computing  we  will  talk  about  had  above  all  an  influence  on  functional
programming and logical programming, which are recent styles of programming and differ from the
imperative style. Moreover, they are linked even more directly to the developments of mathematical
logic since the ‘30s.
Mathematical logic, in its ‘metamathematical’ analysis aspect, has Mathematics themselves as its
object  of  study,  its  languages  and  its  deductive  methods,  like  geometry,  to  take  a  purely
mathematical discipline as an example, has as its object of study figures and structures of space.
One can therefore imagine rather artificial  but  convenient  a  three-level  stratification,  which  has
organised, with the passing of this century, the ‘mathematical discourse’: the geometric-algebraic
structures,  the  mathematical  theories  which  study  them  (algebra,  geometry...)  and,  finally,
metatheories that deal with mathematical theories and where one may develop a ‘theory of proofs’
(one will also try to see the limits of this ‘organisation of mathematical discourse’). In other words,
from the point of view of computations and languages, linear algebra and analytic geometry, for
instance, study the expressions that represent lines on a plane or surfaces in space; l-calculus, as a
language of Proof Theory, manipulates words or expressions that represent formal proofs. In fact,
expressions  of  this  language  codify  abstract  mathematical  proofs  and,  therefore  computations
carried out on them correspond to formal operations on proofs, rather than on the lines or on the
surfaces. The fact that l-calculus is programmable, and that in fact it is a paradigmatic programming
language, allows to describe the passage from Proof Theory, as an abstract theory in mathematical
logic, to automated proofs and symbolic calculus, as mathematical methods in computing.
Although we will speak further on of Proof Theory, we will underline here the ‘constructivist’
approach  in  order  to  present  ‘proofs  as  lambda-terms’  and  study  the  computer  version  of
provability.  While  using  l-calculus,  we  will  mention  the  role  of  Category  Theory  in  the
mathematical semantics of deduction and of formal programming languages (see below). Indeed,
the results that link the different sectors of Mathematics and Computer Science place l-calculus and
Combinatory Logic, an equivalent system, at the meeting point of vast sectors of Logic and their
applications, providing these theories with an importance that goes beyond their origins as a system
for calculability or effective  provability. As we have said,  the  two  theories,  which  have  as  a
common  base  the  ‘algebraic  calculus  without  variables’  of  Shoenfinkel  dating  from  the  early
Twenties and that are owed to Church and Curry (1928-1936), essentially proposed to ‘formalise’3
the notion of computable function or process and effective proof,  to  give  them  a  mathematical
definition and to found Mathematics on the ‘unshakeable certainties’ of minimal symbolic systems.
The equivalence, due to Church, Turing and Kleene, with the other computation systems (recursive
functions and Turing machines in particular) provided a complete generalisation for these systems
as instruments for computation as early as the Thirties. During this time, it was l-calculus that
played a central role in the proofs of these equivalence theorems: in fact it was proved that calculable
functions, in Turing's sense, are exactly those that are definable within l-calculus and that these, in
turn, coincide with partial recursive functions (see  Barendregt  [1984]).  The  coincidence  of  the
expressive capacities of these diverse formal systems suggested to Turing and Church a working
hypothesis known as Church's Thesis: all intuitively calculable functions in a finite manner (a finite
number of instructions, a finite number of computation steps...) can be represented in one of the
mentioned systems and therefore, thanks to the equivalence, in all of them.
In the same way and till today, l-calculus played a central role while becoming an important
medium, as we will try to establish, in the applications of Proof Theory and Category Theory to
Computer Science, and also a language for automatic proof, especially thanks to some of its recent
extensions, such as the Calculus of Constructions (see section 8). In general, automatic methods of
proof allow  deduction  of  theorems  within  a  logic  system,  and  to  synthesise  both  proofs  and
theorems. In this paper, we will omit a fundamental aspect: the methods known as methods of
resolution  and  unification.  The  difficult  technique  of  these  methods  renders  their  synthetic
presentation arduous; and furthermore, a glance over the other aspects  of  automatic  elaboration
(symbolic  calculus,  functional  programming  and  its  mathematical  semantics),  more  than  the
deepening of specific techniques, allows for a better outline of the transfer of certain mechanical
tasks from the man to the machine, by treating them from the point of view of different forms of
mathematical knowledge.
In sections 2 and 3, we will present ‘types as propositions’, that is to say that we will study a
very  simple  logical  calculus,  whose  system  of  proofs  is  a  calculus  of  terms,  the  terms  of
l-calculus. The goal of this presentation isn't only to give a certain unity to these related topics, but
to produce a simple ‘semantic’, for both logical formulas and types. In fact, on one  hand,  the
logical meaning of types is certainly rich in information, particularly for the reader who is familiar
with propositional calculus. On the other hand, an interpretation of propositions and proofs as types
and terms (§ 4) can be of great use for the programmer who is accustomed to functional languages
but ignores logic. In other words, we will underline that the translation between diverse formalisms
is a ‘semantic’ itself. However, in chapter 5  we  will  study  the  most  complex  point  of  a  true
‘mathematical semantic’ of a programming language, even if it is in a very limited frame, such as
that of l-calculus. By mathematical semantic, we understand something more than a translation of
a language or formal system into another. In short, a formal sign calculus acquires a mathematical
meaning when basically different mathematical instruments, geometric or algebraic structures for4
example, having an aim, and with independent techniques from the  given  calculus,  provide  an
interpretation  or  translation,  within  these  structures,  of  these  terms  and  formal  operations.  In
general, more of the mathematical structures proposed for interpretation are ‘culturally remote’ from
the formalism in question, more is the provided sense rich in information, because it establishes
unexpected bridges, and requires theories that unify.  It needs to be said that the general study of the
semantics of programming languages rose greatly, specifically thanks to l-calculus, from the work
of D. S. Scott in the Seventies.
Furthermore, this is a concrete experience in computing: an innovative mathematical meaning can
suggest extensions or variations in the language in question, inspired by the present constructions in
the models and not obtainable within the given formalism.
In chapters 6 and 7 we will study the polymorphism and its semantics, that is, the possibility for
a lambda-term or for a functional program to have numerous types or to prove proposition schemes.
Polymorphism is a paradigmatic form of modularity in programming, directly derived from higher
order logic.
Chapter 8 will be devoted to general methods and the limits of automatic proof. Conclusions, in
chapter 9, will provide  the  opportunity  for  a  methodological  reflection.  The  reader  that  solely
wishes to reflect on the ‘philosophical’ thesis of this article can go directly to chapters 8 and 9. The
real motivation of considerations that one finds, resides however in the notions and in the technical
results presented in the preceding sections.
2. Natural Deduction and Terms.
The  basic  idea  of  natural  deduction  systems,  to  those  that  which  we  will  refer,  is  the
formalisation of the notion of logical derivation,  understood  as  the  abstraction  of  mathematical
deduction. The minimum deductive step is given by the  application  of  a  rule  of  inference  that
describes the deduction of a consequence, say C, from given premises, for example A1, A2, ...,
An:
C
A A A n              2 1 .
The rules can be composed vertically, that is, given the rules
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it is possible to compose them in a deduction (or deductive tree) of E over the hypotheses A, B, C,
in the following manner:5
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C
E
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A ‘tree’ represents a deduction formed from the vertical composition of several rules:
C
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:
:
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In this case one can use a fundamental notion, that of erasing. One erases hypothesis A from which
hypothesis B will be derived, if such a derivation is a premise in the deduction of the formula
A ®B. In fact, the truth of A®B does not depend on that of A: it may be observed that A ®B is
true, even when A is false (‘ex falso quodlibet’). Let us suppose for example to have deduced that if
it  rains,  then  the  weather  is  wet.  In  whatever  formal  language  with  an  implication  ‘®‘  this
metalinguistic  deduction  will  have  as  a  formal  consequence  ‘it  rains  ®  the  weather  is  wet’.
However, such an implication is true even if it doesn't rain. One  can  hence  omit  or  erase  the
hypothesis ‘it rains’ in the deduction ‘it rains  ® the weather is wet’, since the formal implication
subsists in any case, independently from the hypothesis, and can be asserted with all truth, even on
a sunny day.
The minimum intuitionist system has as formulas, the atomic formulas, A, B, C, ... and the
implications between formulas, (A ®B), and no others. This one is based, on terms of natural
deduction, only on two inference rules: the introduction rule, (®I), where [A] indicates that A is
erased, and the elimination rule, (®E):6
Introduction rule                                              Elimination Rule
                   [A]
                       :
                   B A         A ®B
(®I) _______ (®E)       ___________________
                  A®B           B
The reader will recognise in (®E) a classic ‘modus ponens’: if A and A imply B, then B. In (®I),
A is erased, in the sense that we mention below, that is to say that it isn't a necessary hypothesis to
validate  (A ®B).  The  rule  (®I)  transfers  into  the  language  of  formulas  the  metalinguistic
deduction 
  
A
B  .  That is, it asserts that from the deduction of B from A, the formula  (A®B)  can be
deduced.
A proof is a tree made of successive applications of rules of inference. The roots, that are at its
base, are the proved theorem. What will interest us more particularly are the metatheorems, that is,
the properties of deductive calculus or, more precisely, of calculus of the terms associated to the
theorems.
The constructive meaning of this minimal system, based solely on the implication, is given by
what is called Heyting-Kleene's interpretation: a proof of  (A ®B) is a procedure of calculus that
transforms every proof of A into a proof of B. We will see that the terms found in l-calculus (l-
terms) formalise this interpretation, they explicitly provide a calculus of proofs. In fact, c : C will
mean that the l-term c is (the code of) an effective proof of the formula C.
Let us build a ‘language for proofs’aand its words (or terms). In other words, let us define the
l-terms. In first place, the variables x, y, ... are the terms, and x : A means that x is an arbitrary
proof of A and that this one can be used in a hypothesis that can eventually be erased. Suppose then
that from an arbitrary proof x of A, that is, x : A, a proof b of B can be deduced, b : B (read b
proves B). Then, the rule ( I ® ) gives A ®B: in our calculus, one will denote lx : A.b the term
that proves A ®B, that is (lx : A.b) : A ®B. If on the other hand c : A ®B and a : A, we will
write (c a) as the term that denotes the application of the proof of c to A ®B to the proof a of A;
this, as we had said, is a proof of B, and thus ca : B.
The rules of inference thus define the l-terms as being variables, x, y..., l-abstraction (lx :
A.b) of a term b w.r. to an arbitrary variable x, and applications (ca) of a term c to a term a. We will7
omit the parenthesis when there is no ambiguity. We can now rewrite the rules of introduction and
elimination as follows
(®I) 
[ ]
B A b A x
B b
A x
® : . :
:
:
:
l
                                                  (®E) 
B a c
B A c A a
:   
:            : ®
.
The rules clarify or give name to the transformations that will pass, for example, from a proof
b A x c . : l º  of  B A ®  to the proof ( ) b A x . : l a of B, for a : A, thanks to (®E). We will observe
that ‘lx : A’ is an abstraction operation that bounds the variable x in lx : A.b, which may occur free
in b, that is to say that it can appear without already being bound to b. In fact, (lx : ...) corresponds
to {x | ...} in set theory or to the integral ò dx   ...  in analysis: the meaning or the value of the term,
the set or the integral, does not depend on the name of the variable, thus {x | P(x)} is equivalent to
{y | P(y)},  ò dx x f   ) (  to  ò dy y f   ) ( , as lx : A.b is identical to ly :  A.b',  provided  that  b'  is
obtained from b when substituting y for x in the correct manner (we write  [ ] x y b º ' b, and we will
equally say that x is renamed  y in b).
We will use |– a : A to indicate the provability of a : A in this minimal system;  the possible
undeleted hypotheses will be placed to the left of ‘|–’ : for example, x : A |– b : B. To simplify this,
we can omit the type A in the term (lx : A.b) : (A ®B), and write lx.b. A  result, mentioned
below, on the possibility to decide the affectation  of  a  proof  to  a  proposition  will  justify  this
convention. We observe that the free variables in one term always depend on a hypothesis which is
not erased: ly.yz : (C®D)®D, for example, will be written instead of    (ly  :  (C®D).yz)  :
(C®D) ®D, under the hypothesis z : C which is not erased. So as to not abuse the l's, we will
abbreviate lx.ly.lz.(...) as lxyz.(...). The  interested  reader  can  study  and  complete  the  two
examples that follow, by observing that those develop the proofs of two axioms of propositional
calculus and, at the same time construct the l-terms that code the proofs. (Those intended axioms,
thus, need not be assumed : the introduction and elimination rules here are strong enough to derive
them).
2.1 Examples:
|– lxyz.xz(yz) :  (A®(B ®C)) ® ((A®B) ® (A®C));
|– lxy.x : A ® (B®A).
Proof: the rules that are used are indicated to the side of the line of inference.8
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We leave the second example, which is simpler, to the reader. Ä
In the worked out example, the hypotheses are all erased in the last three deductive steps; in
particular, the third to last erases two occurrences of the hypothesis z : A. Let us note moreover that
the structure of the term lxyz.xz(yz) bi-univocally codes the tree of the proof of
)) ( ) (( )) ( ( C A B A C B A ® ® ® ® ® ® .
In fact, in a general manner, the order of the applications and the l-abstractions corresponds
exactly to the order in which the rules (®E) and (®I) have just been used.
2.2 Note: 1 (Combinatory Logic). The reader who is experienced in elementary logic will
have perceived that the two proven propositions in the example are  exactly  the  two  axioms  of
(positive) propositional calculus, whose formulas do not contain but the implication and which only
uses the inference rule ‘Modus Ponens’, that we called (®E). Thus, by 2.1, with only the two
rules of inference (®E) and (®I) and without any axioms, we have the possibility to deduce the
axioms of propositional calculus. Now let  ) ( . yz xz xyz S l º  and  x xy K . l º  be the two associated
terms as proofs of the two axioms in our inference system. And well, S and K are the two base
combinators, or constants that, with the sole application (ab), that is the rule  (®E),  constitute
Combinatory Logic. Reciprocally, a theorem  of propositional calculus,  the  deduction  theorem,
restores the rule (®I), thus proving the logical equivalence between l-calculus and Combinatory
Logic.    
2. (Products). The minimal system can easily be widened with conjunctions or product logic.
The following rules introduce and eliminate the product, by associating them the terms which in this
case are equally formed by couples <... , ...> and the first and second projections, p1 and p2, in
addition to the applications and l-abstractions.    
B A b a
B b A a
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Observe  the  constructive  meaning  of  the  introduction  of  the  conjunction:  the  proof  of  the
conjunction of two formulas is constructed from proofs of each component. It needs to be observed
that, since there is no negation, the conjunction is not derivable from the implication.
3. Calculus of Proofs and Terms.
A variable in a term can be instantiated by another term. For example, with the same notation as
the one used to rename variables, we write [a/z](xzx)ºaza to instantiate  x  by  a  in  xzx.  In  an
inductive manner: [a/x]xºa;  if x is not free in b (i.e. it is not bound by l) or if it does not appear in
b,  then [a/x]bºb;  finally, [a/x]ly.cºly.[a/x]c and [a/x](cd)º ([a/x]c)([a/x]d). It also needs to be
supposed that, in ly.[a/x]c the variable y, does not appear to be free in a, otherwise it would be
bound in an improper manner to l (we will say that a is independent for x in ly.c). This condition
is not restrictive: it only forces us to rename y, that appears bound in ly.c with a variable that is not
independent in a if necessary. Computation will essentially be based on the operation of substitution
of a term in the places of occurrence (which might be several) of an independent variable. Lets us
see from the beginning the logical meaning of the operation that needs to be formally introduced.
Consider the following proof:
B a b y
A a B A b y
E
: ) . (
:                                                        : .
    ) (
l
l ®
®              
Since x : A is an arbitrary or hypothetical proof of A and x can have an occurrence in b, the proof
(P.1) is simplified (is reduced) in the following manner:
a : A
(P.2)
[a/x]b : B.
The passage from proof P.1 to proof P.2 is known as the elimination of a cut and corresponds to
the following mathematical reasoning: if I know that from an arbitrary proof x of A I can always
deduce a proof b of B, then, in particular, I can deduce from a specific proof a of A, a specific
proof, [a/x]b of B. To be precise, the inverse reasoning is particularly pertinent and common in
Mathematics: to prove B from a specific proof of A, I may prove at the beginning a general lemma,
that assures me that, from each proof x of A,  I can deduce a proof b of B, that is to say, I prove
that lx.b : A®B;  hence, I obtain the particular case, [a/x]b : B, as an instance of a general case,
(lx.b)a : B. In conclusion, the general proof (lx.b)a, given by the lemma lx.b : A ®B, is reduced
to the particular proof of [a/x]b. We write c > d to say that the term c is reduced to the term d.10
3.1 Definition. 1 - l-calculus (lb>) is the calculus of the terms introduced above based on the
following axiom of reduction:  b x a a b x ] / [ ) . ( > l  where a is independent of x in b (read substitute a
in place of all the free occurrences of x in b).
2 - lbh> calculus is obtained adding the following axiom: lx.cx > c provided x is not independent
in c.
The logical meaning of (h) is not as relevant as that of (b). It can on the other hand be used to
point out the functionality of the calculus we are defining. lx.cx is understood as a function that
depends explicitly on x, whose body of the definition is cx. Now if c does not contain x, apply the
function lx.cx or c directly to a term a, of the same type as x, it is the same thing: indeed, due to
(b), we have (lx.cx)a > ca. Then (h) reduces lx.cx to c.
The  operational  meaning  of  the  symbol  calculus  that  we  present  should  be  clear.  The
fundamental axiom (b) is but a mechanical rule for rewriting: the symbol a is taken and rewritten or
put in place of all the free occurrences of x in b. It is copied n times if x appears n times in b  (in fact
deleted, if  n = 0). In accordance with observation 2.2.2, it becomes easy to widen the computation
of terms by means of logical conjunction: it simply needs to be described formally that the first and
second projections, p1 and p2 choose the first or second element of each couple and that the couples
are always obtained by coupling the first and second projections. The calculus is completed by a
rule that expresses the transitive character of the reduction and by the rules that thus guarantee the
possibility of the application of the axioms in the sub-terms (substitutability). Summarising what is
wanted is the following: if c > d, then lx.a(cb) > lx.a(db),  in any context  lx.a(-b).
3.2 Note (Theories of equality). An immediate extension of the theory of reduction that we
just presented is given by considering the equality between formulas as the minimum congruence
indicated by ‘>‘. That is to say, a > b implies a = b and ‘=’ is the minimal relation, thus created, that
is reflexive, symmetric, transitive and substitutive.  lbh= is the theory of equality.
The fundamental notion is then the notion of normal form for the l-terms. A term is in normal
form if it does not contain sub-terms of the form (lx.b)a,  i.e. sub-terms to which the axiom (b)
can be applied. It has a normal form if it reduces to a term in normal form. We then have the typed
calculus for:
3.3 Theorem (Normalisation). Each term of lb> has a normal form.
From the standpoint of natural deduction, a proof is a normal form when it does not contain the
application of the rule ( ) I ®  followed by the application of the rule ( ) E ® , two rules that, when
followed by each other, introduce (lx.b) and (lx.b)a respectively. Therefore  thanks  to  the  bi-11
univocal correspondence between terms and proofs, that was established by construction, the proof
of 3.3, carried out within the calculus of terms, provides a logical result for the intuitionist Proof
Theory: every proof can be reduced to another, without cuts, of the same assertion.
It needs to be observed that a term can contain several sub-terms to which (b) can be applied,
thus different chains of reduction can arise. However, the following theorem guarantees that they
are always confluent.
Theorem (Church-Rosser). If a term a of lb> is reduced to b and c, then there exists d to
which b as well as c are reduced.
The two proofs require a few specifications (see Hindley & Seldin [1986]). They can easily be
extended, however, to computations with  (h) and the projections for the product (see 2.2.2), since
these reductions do not interfere with  (b).
Therefore, because of the perfect correspondence between terms and proofs, each proof, in the
corresponding deductive systems, has a canonical form, without cuts, by 3.3, and is itself unique in
view of 3.4. If in fact a term a is reduced to two normal forms b and c, those cannot be reduced
again,  in  particular  don't  have  terms  in  common,  they  can't  but  be  identical.  This  fact  also
guarantees  the  non  contradiction  or  consistency  of  the  equation  systems  presented,  where,  in
absence of negation, by consistency we understand that not all equations are provable. In fact, 3.4
is equivalent to the following statement:  c b =  implies that there exists d such that b > d and c > d.
It is therefore not possible to deduce the equality of two distinct normal forms, say b and c, since,
once again, they cannot be reduced to a common d.
In conclusion, this constructive approach to Proof Theory suggests a language where the terms
code  the  proofs.  The  language  can  be  written  by  a  machine,  implemented  and  manipulated
automatically, it suffices that the automaton applies axioms (b) and (h). We have thus presented at
the same time a language for mathematical proofs and a programming language where the programs
are l-terms. On one side, in fact we are able to  manipulate  proofs  as  terms  of  l-calculus;  of
synthesising them from propositions and, inversely, to write the proven proposition from a term; on
the other, to carry out purely symbolic computations of terms without logical meaning. In the next
section we will examine these facts from the viewpoint of programming.
4. Formulas as Types; Calculus without Types.
l-calculus has acquired an important role in programming, especially thanks to the programming
language LISP (List Processing), which is very common in artificial intelligence and the language
ML (Meta Language) and its derivatives, see Mitchell [1993]. In fact, l-calculus became a paradigm12
for all languages that are referred to as functional or application languages, often obtained from this
calculus, solely thanks to extensions with constructions that make them more efficient from the
standpoint  of  programming.  Functional  languages  are  based  on  the  writing  of  programs  as
functions to be applied to arguments (lx.b that is functionally applied to a and reduced to [a/x]b)
instead  of  sets  of  orders  (the  ‘do's’,  ‘go  to's’  of  imperative  language  programming).  The
manipulation is purely symbolical, it does not deal with meaning, a priori: as we have explained, the
base axioms formalise the very simple operations of deletion and copy of symbols.
From the programming point of view, the l-terms are programmed and the propositions (A, B,
(A®B)...), that we have considered as the proven formulas by the l-terms are called types of
programs, taking in this a concept developed by Russell. Intuitively, a type is a set of terms; in the
terminology of Physics, this can be understood as the ‘dimension’ of an expression: in f = ma, in
Mechanics, the expressions that have two members have the ‘type’ of a force. Obviously not all
formulas are propositions: only the formulas that have a proof are. Consider, say, A ®B and A ®
(B ®A): only the second formula is provable and the proof is coded as  x xy K . l º . We will thus
call inhabited a type that is a proposition, that is to say, that, as a formula, it has a proof coded by
terms without free variables. According to what we saw, the type of a term, without a free variable
or that has an explicitly typed variable is unique, while a type can contain several terms even if they
are all in normal form (a theorem can have many proofs). This corresponds to practical intuition,
that a type of program can contain numerous programs: if, for instance, Int is the type (the set) of
integers, Int®Int contains all the programs from the integers with an integer value. The types of
computations presented  until  now  are  called  simple  and,  as  we  have  seen,  correspond  to  the
formulas (and propositions) of a positive propositional calculus.
However  it  still  needs  to  be  mentioned  that  l-calculus  as  well  as  LISP,  as  programming
languages, were conceived without type. In fact, if we only consider the terms that admit types, the
definable  mathematical  functions  are  far  from  numerous:  it  is  due  to  this  that  we  talk  of  the
extensions of l-calculus with variable types in § 5. For us who started with the correspondence
between l-calculus and logic, it is possible to  come  back  to  a  calculus  without  types,  simply
rereading the rules of good formation of terms without any information or restriction of type. Then,
the application (ab) is authorised for each a and b, a = b inclusive, without the restrictions imposed
by the hypotheses in the rule (®E). Evidently, we cannot attribute a type to all the terms: precisely,
xx is a term of the type-free (or untyped) calculus, while it isn't in the calculus with types, since in
the rule (®E)'s hypothesis it cannot be that x has a type A and, at the same time, a type A ®B, as
should be necessary to apply x to itself. The reduction axioms (b) and (h) are identical. However,
for  the  calculus  without  types,  the  normalisation  theorem  (3.3)  is  not  valid.  It  can  be  seen
immediately that for example the term  ) . )( . ( xx x xx x o l l =  does not have normal form: it reduces to
itself indefinitely. It is worthwhile to note the analogy between lx.xx and the non founded set
{ } x x x Î | , which is complementary to the paradoxical set, that suggested to Russell the paradox for13
Frege's system and the introduction of a Theory Types for set theory: it suffices to substitute the set
abstraction { } ... | x  with the abstraction lx... and the self-belonging  x x Î with the self-application
xx. The non convergence of  ) . )( . ( xx x xx x o l l = , a ‘negative’ fact, if you wish, is in reality linked to
the whole expressiveness of computations in a calculus without types. In fact, a variant of o is of
great  interest.  Consider    q º ly.(lx.y(xx))(lx.y(xx))  (like  in  LISP,  the  parentheses  are  very
important!). Then, in terms of equality and of applying three times axiom (b), one obtains  
qa = [a/y](lx.y(xx))(lx.y(xx)) º (lx.a(xx))(lx.a(xx))
= a(lx.a(xx)(lx.a(xx))) = a(qa )
This result is very important, as it ensures that for each term a we can find a fixed point  qa , i.e. an
term such that qa = a(qa ). Moreover, the fixed point is provided in a uniform and effective manner,
in  other  words,  inside  the  language,  thanks  to  the  term  q.  From  this  we  can  deduce  the
representability,  in  l-calculus  without  types,  of  all  the  partial  recursive  functions,  that  we
mentioned  in  the  introduction.  These  precisely  are  defined  by  recursive  equations,  where  the
equations with a fixed point are a generalised version: type-free l-calculus computes all of them, by
solving the defining equations in a uniform and effective manner.
However, having lost all relation to logic (the terms do not necessarily code the proofs, given
that they may be type-free) the problem that arises is that of consistency of reduction or equation
theory, they have been defined exactly in the same way as experienced in the calculus with types,
thus leaving aside all restrictions of type in the formulation of the axioms (b) and (h). Again, in
absence of negation, consistency is expressed in terms of non provability... of all the equations
between the terms. The Church-Rosser theorem (see 3.4), which subsists as well  for  the  lbh
calculus without types, guarantees the fact that the equations are not all deducible: like in the case
with types, thus it is not possible to deduce the equality of distinct normal forms.
As we have already said, terms in normal form are quite important. The normalisation theorem is
the fundamental application of calculus with types in logic, especially important in the case, that we
will mention in chapter 6, of higher order logic. In the calculus without types, the terms with a
normal form represent the computations that end; certain authors, and from the start Church and
Böhm  considered  endowed  with  meaning  only  these  terms  (we  shall  return  to  the  notion  of
‘meaning’, not only in computations but when speaking of models). In that case, because of a result
due to Böhm [1968] (see also Barendregt [1984]) it is not possible to make equal two different
computations that end. More precisely, if: a and b possess different normal forms,  ) ( b a = + lb  is
not consistent. Böhm's theorem also ensures that no calculus of symbols, that is an extension of l-
calculus, can be ambiguous on the computations that end: if they can be expressed in the l-calculus,
we cannot confuse them with each other. From the semantic point of view, Böhm's theorem is a
result of "relative compliteness", relative to normal forms: once that an arbitrary model of calculus
without types is fixed (see § 5), an equality between normal forms is true if and only if it can be
proven.14
Another result, that is extremely interesting for programming, that links non typed calculus with
typed calculus, is the following: one can decide if a term with type is well typed, and also if a non
typed term can be assigned a type (Hindley-Milner algorithm, see Hindley & Seldin [1986]). Said
in other words, given a functional program, or a freely written term, without paying attention to
types, an automatic type-checker can determine if the program is well typed or if it can admit types.
Remember  the  analogy  we  have  mentioned,  between  the  notion  of  type  in  programming  and
dimension in Physics: the type checking algorithm for the functional programs can be compared,
due to its nature and practical side, to the dimensional control of equations in Physics. It is known
that general  algorithms  for  the  control  of  the  exactitude  of  programs  are  not  possible  (Rice's
theorem), that is, it is proven in general that it is not possible to  effectively  control  whether  a
program calculates the function that it is going to implement. Types then provide an effective tool to
partially  control  the  correction  of  programs,  completely  analogous  to  ‘dimensional  control’  in
Physics: given an equation in Physics, one calculates, one develops, and at the end one verifies that
to the left one finds a force (an energy ...), then to the right one also has to find a force (an energy
...), if the computation is correct. In this case it is also about partial control: in no case does the
dimension control ensure the exactitude of the computations made. The same is true for the control
of types in a program. However, almost all computation errors in an equation in Physics, or in the
implementation of a program, are revealed by a dimensional  errors  or  a  type  errors.  The  type
checking algorithm is in fact the heart of programming languages of the kind ML:  in  fact  it  is
divided into a control for the ‘typability’ and a type assignement algorithm, based on the logical
inference rule in § 1.  
Let us summarize finally the relation between terms and types from the view point of logic. In
short, the affectation of a type to a program is the proof of a proposition, that is, its type. The
association of a term to a type is the synthesis of a proof, that coded by the term.
5. Semantics.
Formalisation of the types and terms presented up to now already has an interpretation: types as
propositions, terms as proofs (or vice versa). Let us reflect now on the possibility of a mathematical
meaning, non formal or by a purely sign calculus, for the introduced rules and terms. It is desirable
to make room for this aspect, apparently not important for the mechanic elaboration, for at least two
reasons.  Abstract  logic  formalisms  can  be  adapted  to  machines  that  elaborate  without  ‘giving
meaning’, but that  are  often  hostile  to  human  intelligence.  Comprehension  of  a  logic  system,
whether it be essential or minimal in the formal parts, improves if it is immersed in mathematical
structures,  not  necessarily  constructive  nor  elementary,  but  based  on  known  experiences  of
conceptual synthesis or non formal intuition of space-time. Lastly, the role played by l-calculus in15
Computer Science, as a symbolic manipulator and language that describes mathematical functions,
is also due to the study of semantics of programming languages that it itself inspired.
We will remember that the two inference rules of l-calculus, (®I) and (®E), have very precise
roles. The first one "introduced" the metalinguistic deduction from  A  to  B,  into the language as a
formal implication ‘A ®B,  as well  as  the  terms  that  code  it.  This  passage  is  essential  for  a
formal/linguistic treatment of logic as metamathematics: its object of study is mathematical proof and
it may give a rigorous linguistic form to deduction in Mathematics, which is often informal, always
metalinguistic, of an assertion in a specific language or mathematical theory (the language or theory
of groups, of topological spaces...). The other rule, (®E), codes with the terms of l-calculus the
classic  ‘modus  ponens’  underlining  its  functional  character,  as  already  described  by  Heyting-
Kleene's interpretation. That is to say that the intuitive meaning of A ®B is that of being a set of
effective functions or procedures that transform the elements (proofs) of A into elements (proofs) of
B.
In order to give a rigorous mathematical meaning to this intuitive meaning of syntax, we recall
the mathematical definition of category as a collection of objects, A, B,... and morphisms between
objects,  f,  g,...  Morphisms  include  the  identity  idA  for  each  object  A  and  are  closed  by
composition,  g f o ; associativeness  ) ( ) ( h g f h g f o o o o =  and the identity properties foid = f and
id og = g, complete the definition (see Asperti & Longo [1991]). The category of sets (without
structure)  with  classic  functions  between  sets  like  morphisms,  the  category  of  groups  with
homomorphisms between groups like morphisms and that of topological spaces, with continuous
functions as morphisms, are the common examples of categories. In fact, a category is often a
collection of ‘structured sets’ where the structural properties are described by sets, which are not
necessarily  structured,  of  morphisms  between  each  pair  of  objects.  The  reader,  even  if
inexperienced can understand in an intuitive manner, that the notion, be it explicit or implicit, of
category is fundamental in Mathematics.  
We  understand  thus  our  formal  symbols  and  logical  computations  by  interpreting  types  as
objects and terms as appropriate category morphisms. However, in general the space of morphisms
between two objects of a category is a collection or a set ‘outside’ the category, in other words, as
we have said, it is not necessarily structured as the objects of the category in question, exactly like
the deduction of mathematical and metalinguistic practice is outside the theory or the mathematical
language object of this study. The necessity to correlate the two notions is clearly suggested by the
Heyting-Kleene interpretation of the type A ®B as a collection of morphisms of A in B, see § 2.
Then, to give a mathematical meaning to the rule (®I), that brings metalinguistic deduction inside
the  language,  it  should  be  necessary  to  find  categories  in  which  the  notion  of  collection  of
morphisms between two objects can be internalised, that is, that it can be seen as an object of the
given category. In other words, if A and B are objects of the category C, it will also be needed that16
C[A,B], the set of morphisms of A in B, be it (represented by) an object of the same category, the
exponent of A in B, that we define by BA or A ®B. In the case of the category of sets (without
structure), it is clear that the notion of morphisms space is immediately  internalised:  the  set  of
functions between two sets is a set, that is, an object of the category. This is not the case of the
other  two  examples  in  which  the  objects  are  sets  with  structure:  in  general,  homomorphisms
between two groups do not form a group. When dealing with topological spaces, even if the set of
continuous functions between two topological spaces can be given a topological structure, it is not
always  the  case  that  it  itself  has  the  necessary  property  to  define  exponents  in  a  sufficiently
expressive  manner  so  as  to  interpret  the  types  as  objects  and  the  terms  of  the  l-calculus  as
morphisms. One observes in the first place that a l-abstraction allows the formation of a function of
more arguments, by ‘an argument at a time’: given a term a : A, that may contain two free variables
x : B and y : C, the term lx : C.(ly : B.a) : (C®(B ®A)) has the meaning of a function that on
taking an argument in C gives as a result a function ly : B.a in (B ®A). But the two free variables
in  a,  equally  give  a  :  A  the  meaning  of  a  function  of  two  arguments:
( ) ( ) A B C a B C y x ® ´ ´ > < : . : , l , provided that we have some notion of product in the category
of meanings. But this is easy: the Cartesian product of two sets is a set and the same holds as for
groups and topological spaces. The categorical generalisation of the idea of Cartesian product as a
(structured) set of couples of two (structured) sets is simple and we send the reader to the existing
literature  or  cited  text  for  details.  The  difficulty  lays  precisely  in  the  following  fundamental
operation of l-calculus called ‘currying’ (due to H. B. Curry, see Hindley & Seldin [1980]): a
function of several arguments can be defined in an equivalent manner by  the  abstraction  of  an
argument each time. For example, it would be necessary, so that topological spaces provide an
interpretation, that a continuous function be considered such, knowing only that it is so w.r. to each
argument; it is known on the contrary that, in topology, there exist functions of several variables,
continuous in relation to each argument, but not globally continuous, that is not continuous in the
topology of the product space. The reader that is familiar with elementary continuous functions on
product  spaces  and  that  knows  that  continuity  cannot  be  proved  variable  by  variable,  has
understood the real mathematical meaning of l-abstraction and its expressive power: if endowed
with great inventiveness or mathematical experience, he/she can construct the class of categories that
can provide a rigourous semantic to this peculiar phenomenon. Let us now present them explicitly,
for convenience of the readers.
The property required by a category to interpret l-calculus is to be Cartesian Closed, that is to
have all products C´B and an isomorphism (uniformly internal to the  category  or  natural,  see
Asperti & Longo [1991]) between (C® (B ®A)) and (C´B ®A), for all C, B and A, objects of
the category. For different reasons, as we have said, groups and topological spaces do not have this
property. Again, the category of sets comes to our rescue: this isomorphism is trivial between sets.17
However, in the semantics of l-calculus it is necessary to go beyond the simple category of
unstructured sets. From the start, as l-calculus is also a paradigm for functional programming and,
if we  want  to  write  sufficiently  expressive  programs  with  a  calculus  with  simple  types,  it  is
necessary to understand it to have the possibility to give recursive definitions of functions. Those,
as we have said in § 4, are the ones that are definable in the calculus without types (and thus in the
programming language LISP and its dialects). They must be added in the case of languages with
types like the language ML. In fact we remember that a recursive definition of a term or a function f
is given when this one is the solution of an equation x = a(x), or well when f is a fixed point of a, §
4. For example, the factorial function      fact        can be defined as follows, by an equation:
fact       (n) = if n = 0 then 1, otherwise n·    fact      (n – 1).
Now, while supposing to have coded our metalanguage in l-calculus, that is our (if ... then ...)
and in allowing some abuse of the language, the term  . xy a l = (if y = 0 then 1, otherwise y·x(y–1))
has as a fixed point the factorial since     fact       = a    fact      . According to what we observed in § 4 on the
calculus without types, by taking     fact       = qa one mechanically obtains the solution. Moreover, if one
finds a mathematical semantic of typed calculus in which there exists an operator, a functional, with
the properties of q, this would justify and also guarantee the logical consistency of the extension of
this calculus with a term  having  q's  property.  We  are  interested,  in  second  place,  in  a  more
structured category than that of sets because we want to find in it a model of the calculus without
types. In the end this isn't ‘but a particular case’ of calculus with types: it is the same calculus
without the restrictions of types or, if one wants, it is a calculus with a single ‘universal’ type. It
should be necessary, to give meaning, to find a structure with a ‘universal’ type in the sense that it
must contain all the functions on the proper elements; then, each term could be applied to every
other term, and in particular to itself. However, no set can ‘contain’ the set of functions defined on
it, except a set composed of a single element or the trivial set. In fact, a classic Cantor result ensures
that the set of functions on a non trivial set is strictly larger, in terms of cardinality, than the given
set. We will find, and it is not easy, a non trivial topological space in which one can isomorphically
immerse the space of endomorphisms (morphisms of an object on itself).
With this double goal in mind, the recursion for terms with types and a model for the calculus
without types,  we  will  construct  a  subcategory  of  the  category  of  topological  spaces  that  are
Cartesian Closed and that have fixed points for every endomorphism. Furthermore, it will contain a
universal  object,  in  which,  in  particular,  its  own  endomorphisms  can  be  immersed.  The
construction demands certain mathematical attention.
Let us take a partially ordered set (A,  £), a subset D of A is called directed if every pair of
elements of D admits an upper bound in D (that is:  D y x Î " ,  (for all x and y in D)  D Î $z    (there18
exists z in D) x£z & y£z).  Now let      A       = (A, A0,  £) be a partially ordered set and A0 a subset of
A; A is a Scott space (S-space) if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. every directed set D admits a least upper bound, sup D, in A;
2. A has a least element, lets say Ñ;
3. for every x and y in A, if x/£y (x is not inferior or equal to y), there exists z0 in A0 such
that z0£x and z0/£y (A0 separates elements in A);
4. for every x0 and y0 in A0, if x0 and y0 have an upper bound in A, then they have a least
upper bound z0 = sup {x0, y0} in A0.
The reader that knows some Geometry can observe that each S-space       A        can  be  endowed  a
topological structure, given by the order, that has as base elements {zÎA: x0£z} for x0 in A0, and
the empty set. In such a topology, the continuous functions between two S-spaces are all monotone
(non decreasing), that is, they preserve order and, in particular, when applied to a directed set the
result is a directed set. Moreover, if f is continuous and D is directed the f (sup D) = sup f (D).
An interesting example of an S-space is constituted by the set of subsets, PB, of an arbitrary
infinite set B. It suffices to take the inclusion between sets as a partial order, the collection of finite
sets as subsets PB0 of PB, so that PB = (PB, PB0, Í) satisfies (1-4), with the empty set as least
element.
One can now verify that the category of S-spaces is Cartesian Closed. Thus, a function with
more than one argument is continuous if it is continuous in each argument. The Cartesian closure
guarantees the possibility to interpret types as S-spaces. The interpretation of l-terms as morphisms
is an easy induction  over  the  structure  of  the  terms  themselves:  each  variable  of  type  A  is  a
morphism of the trivial space {o}, with a single element, in the interpretation of A; the abstraction
lx : A.b : A®B  defines a morphism of the interpretation of A into that of B; the formal application
cd, for c : A®B and d : A, is the functional application of c to d.
The other property of the construction that interests us is that the objects of the category are
topological spaces that also are complete partial orders which is exactly what is required in  the
hypothesis (1). It is now possible to use a construction due to Knaster and Tarski to construct
minimum fixed points of monotone functions. If f is any continuous function, and thus monotone,
of an S-space      A       into      A      , then the chain  ..., )) ( ( ) ( ) (
2 £ Ñ = Ñ £ Ñ £ Ñ f f f f as a directed set, admits a
least upper bound, sup  ) (Ñ
n f . Indeed, as f is continuous, f (supn   ) (Ñ
n f ) = supn f ( ) (Ñ
n f ) =
supn  ) (Ñ
n f ; furthermore, supn  ) (Ñ
n f  is the minimum fixed point of f. Thus, the functional Q (f)
= supn  ) (Ñ
n f , that associates to each endomorphism f of the category its minimum fixed point,
provides an interpretation for a recursion operator q of l-calculus with types.19
In  conclusion,  we  have  constructed  a  mathematical  model  of  the  calculus  with  types  and
operators of fixed points. The instruments used are taken from elementary Geometry and are all
independent of l-calculus.
 It is now necessary for us to find, in the category of S-spaces, a model for the calculus without
types, in which the terms can be at the same time functions and arguments of functions. To be able
to do this it  is  necessary  to  construct  an  object  that  contains  or  into  which  the  spaces  of  its
endomorphisms (functions are elements) can be immersed and such that each element defines an
endomorphism (elements are functions). Recall that the power set of an infinite set is an S-space
and consider the familiar power set PN, of the set N of natural numbers. The proof that the order
and topological structure of PN, as an S-space, has the desired qualities is rather technical and uses
the property of integer numbers; in particular, the possibility to code pairs  and  finite  sets  with
numbers (see Scott [1976]). Thus, every  function is an element of PN and, conversely, every
aÎPN can be applied, as a function, to each element bÎPN: the application ab between arbitrary
elements of PN gives a meaning to the formal application between arbitrary terms, without type
restriction, as it is defined in the type-free calculus.
The  above  mentioned  construction  completes  the  semantics  of  l-calculus  with  and  without
types,  while  giving  a  mathematical  meaning  to  abstract  symbol  manipulations,  such  that  the
internalisation of the metalinguistic application, l-abstraction, the auto-applicability of a  term  to
itself. The autonomy of the used topological structure from the syntax has been underlined not only
for epistemological reasons, linked to the notion of meaning as translation, all the more filled with
information than the possibility to correlate the different universes, but also for practical reasons. As
we said in the introduction, the issue that we study is not only a particular case of mathematical
research in Computer Science; in fact, the semantics of l-calculus has had a paradigmatic role in the
manner in which research activity is carried out in the semantics of programming languages. In
certain cases, the meaning of geometric or algebraic structures has suggested variants or extensions
to programming languages (the ML dialect CAML, the extensions of the prototype language Quest
... and much more). Sometimes, the obscure programming constructions, which are barely clear for
the  author  himself,  become  intelligible,  and  are  improved  if  needed.  The  effort  to  immerse
languages and programs in solid mathematical models has certainly (and at least) contributed to an
important improvement of the presentation style of many of them. It is certain that in recent years
some programming manuals have become readable, or almost readable, thanks to the increasing
influence of a mathematical style that encourages, at the same time, rigor generality and search for
meaning.
6. Polymorphism20
At the end of § 4 we said that given a term without types, is ‘decidable’ if it can be assigned a
type. This type however, is not necessarily unique: the identity lx.x, for example has type A ®A
for all types A. That is, it has a scheme of type, denoted usually by metavariables of type: X ®X.
The Hindely-Milner type assignement algorithm (§ 4), implemented in ML, gives to each term, if it
has it, the most general scheme for which all other scheme or type of the term in question is a
particular instance. For example, lx.x also has the scheme (Y ®Y)  ® (Y ®Y), a particular of
X ®X. The notion of type scheme is completely analogous to that of axiom schemes in logic. To
return to the examples given in 2.1, lxy.x has a type scheme (the most general) X ® (Y ®X) and
this is one of the two axiom schemes of positive propositional calculus of which we talked about in
2.2.1
Thus, briefly, terms without types, when they can be given a type, are polymorphic, because
they have type schemes and thus usually more types, contrary to what we saw in § 2 and 3 when
dealing with terms with types. The languages of the class ML are polymorphic exactly in this sense.
From the point of view of logic, the programs are the proofs of schemes of propositions.
In  the  implicit  polymorphism,  ML  style,  quantification  by  relation  of  variables  of  type  is
metalinguistic and only external to type schemes. Recall now the elementary or intuitive meaning of
types  as  sets  or,  more  formally,  as  objects  of  a  category.  Explicit  quantification,  within  the
language, on variables of sets or objects of a category is on the contrary at the base of second order
systems, where sets  or  objects  of  categories  are  quantified.  In  particular,  it  is  at  the  base  of
Analysis, interpreted as a second order arithmetic, since real numbers are sets of integer numbers.
Second order l-calculus, lbh2 (the F system of Girard in 1971, see Girard [1989]), is obtained
when  adding  quantification  by  relation  to  the  variables  of  type.  Before  speaking  of  explicit
polymorphism we observe that  the  polymorphism  of  a  program  can  be  seen  as  an  invariance
property by relation to types as structures. That is, the program lx.x, that calculates the identity, or
lxy.x, which calculates a constant function in the first argument, are invariant by relation to each
domain of arguments.
The reading of the end of this paragraph (and its semantics in § 7) requires certain attention,
although, formally it only supposes instruments already introduced. Higher order logics are based
in fact on an ulterior mathematical abstraction.
The types of lbh2 are obtained while extending those of lbh= with variables of type, X, Y, …
and with universally quantified types,  A Tp X . : "  where Tp is the collection of types (read for all
X, A is valid, where it can appear X in A); the terms are also constructed from abstraction with
relation to type variables,  a Tp X . : l , and the application of terms to types, bA. The rules that are
introduced by the new types and terms are the following:21
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(*) in b no free variables has the type which depends on X.
The first rule forms functions from the collection of types to terms. The second states that a term b
can be (functionally) applied to a type A and give a term bA within type B where it substitutes A in
X.
The axioms that need to be added to (b) and (h) in § 3 are the following (observe that they are
the second order version):
) ( b " b X A A b Tp X ] / [ ) . : ( = l with A free of X in b
) ( h " : ) . : ( a aX Tp X = l with X not free in a.
For  example,  (lX  :  Tp.lx  :  X.x)  :  (" X.X ®X)  is  the  second  order  identity  or  explicitly
polymorph; lX : Tp.(lY : Tp.(lx : X.ly : Y.x))of type " X " Y.X ®(Y ®X) is the function that
is explicitly polymorph and constant in the second argument. Applying the first to a type A one
obtains (lX : Tp.lx : X.x)A = lx : A.x, the identity of type A ®A. In an analogous fashion for
(lX : Tp.(lY : Tp.(lx : X.ly : Y.x)))AB : (A ®(B ®A)).
The types inhabited are exactly the theorems of what we call second order propositional calculus,
which is the subjacent logic system of Analysis, as second order Arithmetic (real numbers are sets
of  integer  numbers,  this  is  why  we  need  the  quantification  over  sets).  In  addition,  one  can
understand  the  Computer  Science  side  shown  in  this  passing  to  a  second  order:  types  are
‘automatically updated’ since terms can take types as arguments. That is to say, types are dealt with
within the language or manipulated by a formal calculus feasible for a machine, instead of being
handled outside the language in a metalinguistic manner.
Observe that the theory of types of lbh2 is essentially impredicative (or non predicative).  In
other words, while stating that  A Tp X . : "  is a type, formally ( A Tp X . : " ) : Tp, one defines an
element of the collection of types, Tp, and this is done by quantifying on the collection  Tp itself
(note that the defined type  A Tp X . : "  contains the quantification  Tp X : " .) Such definitions are
commonplace in Analysis, or Topology: for instance, when one defines a set as the intersection of a22
collection of sets that may include the set that is being defined (least upper or greatest lower bounds,
Lebesgue measure, …). The impredicativeness of types is at the base of the expressiveness of the
language and constitutes a non negligible logical or semantical challenge. However, even for lbh2,
the normalisation and Church-Rosser theorems are valid, stated as done so in 3.3 and 3.4;  the
proof, of the first in particular, is rather complex by the impossibility of stratifying the formulas and
using any form of induction, due to the implicit circularity in the impredicative definition of types
(Girard  [1989],  see  Hindley  &  Seldin  [1986).  By  means  of  the  analogy  between  types  and
propositions (belonging to the second order, now), the normalisation and Church-Rosser theorems
prove the results of ‘elimination of cuts’ and ‘uniqueness of canonical proofs (or normal form)’ for
second order systems, like we observed for propositional calculus in § 3. Moreover, these results
guarantee  the  logical  consistency  of  calculus  of  types  and  equation  calculus,  confirming  the
robustness  of  impredicative  constructions  that  are  at  the  base  of  Analysis  as  second  order
Arithmetic.  The  relation  with  this  last  theory  is  shown  by  the  theorem  that  characterises  the
expressiveness  of  calculus.  Because  of  the  normalisation  theorem  it  may  be  shown  that  the
representable functions are all total (always convergent). In fact, the computable functions in lbh2
are exactly the recursive functions that can be proved total in second order Arithmetic (Girard Lafont
Taylor [1986]). Such a set of functions is much larger than that of recursive primitive functions and
it largely includes all total functions which one can need for practical computing. However, current
experimental programming languages based  on  explicit  polymorphism  extend  lbh2  with  fixed
point operators or recursive operators. Then, the normalisation theorem is not valid anymore and
the correspondence between programs and proofs is lost; however, the effectiveness of recursion,
as an instrument to define functions, allows a greater simplicity for programming.
7. Semantics of Polymorphism
The  mathematical  meaning  of  polymorphism  is  relatively  simple  in  the  case  of  implicit
polymorphism: it is only needed to correlate the meaning of terms without type to their version
when assigned types. Consider thus the model      P           N       = (PN, PN0,  Í) of calculus without types
mentioned at the end of § 5 and recall that in it every element aÎPN is an endomorphism and vice
versa: ab interprets the functional application between terms, considered as elements of the model.
To interpret types, construct the category PER of partial relations of equivalence on      P           N       in  the
following manner. Objects are partial equivalence relations, A, B… on PN (subsets of the product
PN´ PN, which are symmetric and transitive, but need not be reflexive: elements  need  not  be
correlated to themselves). PER is Cartesian Closed. The base construction to verify it is quickly
given:  the  internalisation  of  the  morphism  space  between  two  objects  A  and  B  is  the  partial
equivalence relation A ®B such that (d,d')Î(A ®B) if and only if, for all (a,a')  ÎA, (da,d'a')
ÎB; in other words, d and d' are equivalent in A®B if they transfom equivalent elements of A into
equivalent elements of B. It is precisely this construction of the internal space of morphisms that
leads to choose partial relations: take an arbitrary d  and a rather small relation target B, then, d does23
not associate all equivalent elements in A to equivalent elements in B. Thus, it is not generally the
case that (d,d)Î(A ®B), in other words, not all d is equivalent to itself in A ®B. In PER the
affectation of types to terms without type has the following meaning: if a term c is formally given a
type C, then the interpretation in PN of c, as a term without type, is equivalent to itself in the
interpretation of type C as a partial relation of equivalence.  Since this is true for each interpretation
of free variables in c with elements in PN and variables (of type) free in C with objects of PER, we
have given a correct meaning to polymorphism: every term, seen as an element of PN, has many
relations, and in particular all those that interpret its formal types. One also succeeds in showing the
interpretation of a term without type in the equivalence class of its interpretation as a term to which
all the types are given. This completes the semantic  correlation  between  terms,  types,  calculus
without types and the assignement of type schemes.
To move on to explicit polymorphism, recall that it is based on a impredicative theory of types, a
theory in which the type  A Tp X . : "  is obtained quantifying on the collection of all types. The
general mathematical meaning, in fact categorical, of this construction is not obvious. In the first
place,  it  is  a  question  of  interpreting  the  universal  quantification  Tp X : "   as  an  indexed  (or
generalised) product. In fact, for the rule ( E " ), if a:  A Tp X . : " , then aB  :  [B/X]A;  in  other
words, the term  a  is  interpreted  as  a  function  that,  taking  (the  interpretation  of)  a  type  B  as
argument, gives a result (the interpretation of) in a type A in which B is substituted for the variable
X. This is precisely the intuitive definition of n product indexed by an arbitrary set, an idea that
generalises the ordinary product between sets: a Cartesian product is a product indexed by a finite
set. The difficulty lays in finding a category that is closed w. r. to a product indexed over the
category itself: in fact, if the collection Tp of types is interpreted by the collection of objects of a
category,  A Tp X . : "  has to be interpreted as a product indexed over the category and also has to be
an object of the category. The reader  must  pay  attention  to  the  strong  reflexiveness  or  strong
property of closure that we require; its rigorous understanding is a typical and beautiful side of
Mathematics in which the geometrical and categorical instruments give meaning to symbols that
otherwise would not be but a game of signs: we can obviously write ( A Tp X . : " ) : Tp, with Tp,
the definiendum that appears in the definiens, it is here that it is interesting to comprehend if we
mean something. Many indeed find this writing unacceptably circular, in spite of  the  important
syntactic results of normalisation and Church-Rosser that have been cited.  The construction of a
sound mathematical model makes it acceptable.
Briefly, the category PER has the desired property of closure. To fully prove this however, it is
necessary to immerse PER into a larger context, one in which a product indexed by PER itself can
be defined. The idea is to find a category in which one can immerse PER as a subcategory, and at
the same time, as an object on which the product can be defined. The answer is given thanks to an
appropriate  topos.  These  are  categories  with  strong  closure  properties  and  provide  models  of
intuitionist set theory. In a particular topos, said to  be  ‘effective’  and  built  in  generalising  the24
construction of the category PER, one can define the product indexed by PER, considered as an
object of the topos itself. The result, say  ) ( PER A F AÎ Õ , is not only an object of the topos but of
PER, which is also a subcategory of the  topos.  In  other  words,  ( ) ( PER A F AÎ Õ ),  the  product
indexed over PER, is an object of PER, as a (sub-)category. In carrying out the construction step
by step, one ‘understands’, mathematically, what an obscure impredicative formal definition can
mean (see Asperti  &  Longo  [1991]).  In  particular,  the  relations  or  sets  of  subsets  of  natural
numbers, the objects of PER, are defined and understood independently of the product in question;
thus the circularity in the syntax of the collection of types, Tp, defined while listing between the
types  also  those  obtained  by  the  products  indexed  by  the  collection  itself  (or  quantifications:
A Tp X . : " ), is reduced to proving a closure property of a predefined mathematical structure. Since
this  semantics  is  based  on  geometrical  categories  (the  topos  have  their  origin  in  Algebraic
Geometry), that can as well provide an interpretation to intuitionist set theory, we have in a certain
sense closed the scope of our understanding. We started from a formal propositional calculus and
from terms of  the  intuitionist  propositional  calculus,  both  simple  and  second  order  calculi,  in
passing by topological and order structures, the relations on natural numbers, quotient spaces, etc…
we have given an interpretation to apparently circular formalisms and found an independent link to
other aspects of logic, and intuitionist set theory.  The  thus  established  unity  between  different
theories gives a meaning, and adds to the comprehension, of each of them; it shows the proofs as
programs, morphisms, calculable functions, while proposing a rigorous mathematical  frame  for
programming in machines. This is only one possible semantic construction, but, as a side effect, it
also  helps  to  enrich  the  empirical  methodology  of  programming:  the  untranslatable,  non
generalisable,  ‘ad  hoc’  solutions  that  are  only  understandable  by  the  programmer,  which  are
sources of mistakes, are "understood" in a unified manner, and in a uniform mathematical style.
8. Automatic Proof
We started this presentation by underlining the role of l-calculus as a language for proofs: each
term of the calculus with types is the coding of a proof and its reduction in normal form leads to a
canonical or ‘minimum’ proof of the proposition corresponding to its type. Moreover, if a term
without types admits a simple type, the assignement of a type to a term and its reduction to normal
form can be done in an automatic way. They are thus the instruments for automatic proof, and in
particular for the proofs of program properties. In fact, it is a program property to admit types or
not; but not only this, a type is in reality a specification or a way to specify a program. While saying
that a program goes from integers to booleans, one specifies a property that partially contributes to
define it. In certain cases, the type can univocally determine the program: there exists only one
program, that is understood as a term without free variables and that has type  ) .( X X X ® " , the
identity. In other words, if one specifies a program as a function that applies each type to itself, the
formal description of the type, of second order, univocally determines the program that calculates
the identity function.25
In general, as we have already said, the type assignement to a program is at the same time, a
proof of logical propositions, the types, and a synthesis method of programs (which is automatic).
Let us return to the second example in 2.1: stqrting with hypotheses on variables, one constructs a
program of type A ®(B ®A) step by step. In fact, the only program with type scheme   X ®
(Y ®X).  Thus already, in the current context, we can say that we have a partial method to prove
propositions  and  program  properties,  and  also  of  program  synthesis  (programs  or  proofs  are
synthetized by this proof method).  A  partial method, because, it requires  an  external  (human)
intervention in choosing the hypotheses that can be added if necessary along the deduction process,
and also because, by comparison with the statements on programs, one can deduce in this manner
only some properties and some programs.
Moreover, to speak of automatic proof as a substitute for human mathematical proof, we need to
add at least the instruments that can formalise properties that are more or less  commonplace  in
Mathematics. It is indeed obvious that mathematics is based from the start on the use of individual
variables, for the elements of sets, and their quantification. In other words, it is necessary to be able
to write formulas that describe statements as: given any integer there exists another integer that is
larger  than  it;  every  element  of  a  group  has  an  inverse,  etc…  in  the  manner  ) ( y x y x < $ " ,
) 1 (
1 = $ "
- xy y x …  In  the  formulas,  or  types,  introduced  until  now,  there  were  no  first  order
variables, or elements and we passed directly from simple propositional calculus to second order
systems.  These allow us to deal with the logical aspect of mathematical Analysis, not necesseraly
its "mathematics".
Martin-Löf's  (predicative)  Intuitionist  Type  theory  and  Coquand  and  Huet's  Calculus  of
Constructions (see Coquand & Huet [1988]), in different ways, extend the types of l-calculus with
the possibility to also define first order formulas as types, that is with the structure " x:A.B, where
x is a variable of type A (see Hindley & Seldin [1986]). Indeed, l-calculus already has first order
variables: those that appear in the terms. As we have already said, l-abstraction is a quantification
over the terms, analogous to set abstraction: {x | P(x)} is the set of all elements x, of a certain
universe, that satisfy property P. But, the variables are also terms, in full right, and they don't only
have the meaning of elements as in Mathematics. In Mathematics, ‘for every integer  x…’  only
means that x can be particularised by an arbitrary integer. On the contrary, variable x, in l-calculus,
is  also  a  term  in  normal  form  that  can  be  manipulated,  treated  as  the  other  terms,  closed,
constants,… The systems just mentioned use this linguistic richness of l-calculus to give a unified
treatment of formulas and types. Briefly, mathematical formulas are the first order terms and types,
on which on can carry out computations in an automatic and uniform manner. For example, the
formula x(x + 1)=12 becomes, by obvious calculation, x2 + x = 12, where one has declared x as
integer  (a  non  erased  assumption:    x  :  Int).  The  solution  of  the  equation  is  given  by  the
particularisation or substitution  of  x  by  the  integer  3.  Note  that  the  formulas  or  mathematical26
propositions are not but "restrictions" to be satisfied: that is, propositions are types as specifications
and a program is a proof of a specification or type, as in the already discussed cases. One can note
here a substantial difference with Logic Programming where a program is a proposition and its
evaluation is the  proof  of  the  proposition.  The  current  interest  of  an  integration  of  functional
programming methods and logical programming ones is precisely due to the possibility of studying
the synthesis of functional programs,  from  logical  specifications,  as  a  compilation  method  for
logical programs in functional programming. Note though, as it has already been announced in the
introduction, that we have omitted the principal instrument to deal with first order formulas or the
restrictions that describe usual mathematical properties: unification techniques that handle uniform
particularisation  of  first  order  formulas.  These  techniques,  crucial  in  Logic  Programming,  are
introduced in the Calculus of Constructions, both first and second order, the latter being what is
new.
As a whole, the research direction that we have been detailing has given good results, if  they are
read with care. De Bruijn, for example, has developed mathematical jargon in the extensions of l-
calculus of an important intuitive effectiveness (see Hindley & Seldin [1986]). However, the truly
important properties that can be handled are the properties of programs. The purely mathematical
assertions proved in a strictly automatic fashion are not numerous. The problem is that the implicit
richness in a true mathematical proof is found in the language changes, in the bridges and in the
indirect analogies, in the superposition of methods. Their sterilising reduction in a single language,
poor and static, can be of some effectiveness if enriched by the man-machine interaction. In this
perspective,  more  instruments,  to  make  proofs,  are  welcomed,  including  the  automatic  ones.
Various computational algebras, or systems based on  the  language  ‘Mathematica’  for  example,
provide greater effectiveness to the work of the algebrist by intervening when long calculations are
needed,  when  innumerable  explorations  are  required  and  in  other  tasks  in  which  practical
complexity  renders  computation  impossible  for  a  human  being.  The  methods  presented  here,
inspired by l-calculus develop the complementary approach, while aiming to deduce the most for
Mathematics from the logical formalisation. In spite of the limitative character and the failures of any
"completeness program" (mathematics is completely formalisable), considered as a base project,
from the practical standpoint, the interaction between man and machine can create miracles, but only
if one accentuates the interactive character of proofs. Take, for example a proof by induction. l-
calculus perfectly describes the induction scheme and the inductive proofs are a typical candidate for
automatic treatment. However, every one knows that in non trivial cases, the true mathematical
problem, in a proof by induction, lays in the choice of induction hypothesis. Often the ‘inductive
load’ has to be much stronger than the thesis; in other words, to inductively prove " x.P(x), one
does not always succeed in proving that for every n, P(n) can be deduced from P(n – 1) and it is
necessary to turn to a property Q, stronger than P, to have that Q(n – 1) implies Q(n).27
The problem of choosing inductive loads is today a crucial problem in automatic proof. It is not
clear in fact that it suffices to explore a finite number of possible inductive hypotheses or that, to
obtain relatively complete methods, it is necessary to consider an infinite number. That is, if in the
standard sectors of Mathematics, one has only to do long induction proofs or if, rather, such proofs
are essentially difficult, due to the choice of inductive load: the choice criteria between an infinity of
possible inductive hypotheses are difficult because they are generally external to a pre-established
methodology, to a language and a formal frozen frame. They are based on ‘intentional’ choices
where man integrates many experiences, uses analogy, refers to metaphors,…  The  analyses  of
these methods, as a part of the proof, is one of the stakes of the future, if one does not want to be
restricted to a solely formal analysis of proofs that can be fully mechanised. The project then is the
development of interactive programs of automatic synthesis of proofs where, for example, the user
tells the machine the propositions to be proved in the induction (the inductive load) and lets the
machine do the base work. The study of interactive or heuristic methods that are as automated as
possible can lead to useful or acceptable systems, even if they remain incomplete.
9. Conclusion
In this presentation of l-calculus we have sought with insistence to describe l-terms, at the
same time as programs, as codification of proofs and as category-theoretic morphisms. That is, we
explained  and  enriched  syntax  by  semantics  and  viceversa.    By  this,  we  underlined  that  the
"cognitive" aspects of Mathematics are also present in proofs, if not in a principal role, but yet in
bridges, in correlation between diverse contexts, where the informal suggestion, for instance, that
allows to extend a language by a  construction  inspired  by  a  model  have  a  great  practical  and
gnoseological interest. The proposal of new ideas and structures, the formulation of conjectures
often are made possible thanks to a reflexive equilibrium of theories that integrate and explain each
other mutually and are developed and modified in interaction. The unity of mathematics is given,
not by a logical, linguistic or metaphysical unity but by the relations between theories and diverse
languages.  This is crucial, if we want to go  further  in  automatizing  as  much  as  possible  the
deductive processes as well as in foundational analysis.
Luckily, the time is over for a ultimate and unique purely formal foundation of Mathematics,
which  inventors of l-calculus and Combinatory Logic took as starting point in the Thirties. Only
extreme formalists and reductionists are still pleased by heavy totalling  programs.  Their  efforts
sometimes  are  not  useless,  evven  today,  thanks  to  Computer  Science,  where  pure  minimal
computations of  signs  can  suggest  more  languages  adapted  to  machines.  Furthermore,  this  is
exactly what is achieved by the examined systems: the formalist attitude at their origin has found an
application, on the one hand within the rigidity of machines and it has been enriched, on the other,
by its reencounter with mathematical Platonism or realism. In fact, this is the implicit or explicit28
vision of researchers who seek meaning in geometric and categorical structures, while contributing
to the intertwining of meaning to which they refer to.
More in general, the formalist approach and the Platonism spread in Mathematics, apparently
completely different, have a common justification and origin in the observation that a mathematical
concept, leaving aside the specific structure from where it emerges, acquires a generality and an
independence that renders it applicable to many structures. Logical computations of which we spoke
of here, in their perfect linguistic autonomy, that include provable consistency (see §  3),  are  a
paradigmatic  example  of  independence,  generality  and  abstraction  that  make  us  ‘forget’  the
structures that suggested them: algebras without variables for Combinatory Logic (Curry), the idea
of (effective) function for l-calculus (Church). Then it was not trivial to re-construct mathematical
models that interpret the formalisations that have finally been reached. These structures branch out
into many connections and applications, often well beyond expectation.
It is necessary to underline, to this effect, that it is precisely the generality and the independence
from specific meanings that is the origin of  this  generality  and  objectivity  of  Mathematics:  the
importance of an idea and a theorem reside in their invariance by relation to linguistic notation and to
particular mathematical structures. The concrete historical experience of this invariance w. r. to a
plurality of practical universes, often as real as counting with numbers, is at the base of formalist
foundations or ontological visions in Mathematics, as we said. Both, each  in  its  own  manner,
attribute universality and existence to the pure, although very refined, linguistic and geometrical
constructions of man, and are due to the mathematician's amazement when faced with the generality
of these constructions nevertheless arisen from life and real world conceptual reconstructions.  By
mathematics we made the (physical) world intelligible and, then, by an abuse, we later detached one
from the other.
One of our tasks today is to fix this formalism/Platonism breach and to surpass it, to understand
mathematical proof not as pure formal calculus without meaning nor as a ‘vision’ of an external
reality to man, given by concepts without conceptors. It is especially necessary to analyse them as
conceptual constructions, rich with the plurality of human experiences, that go from a purely formal
calculus to the practice of geometrical construction. As a matter of fact, meaning is involved in a
non removable way in proofs: certain passages are possible only due to references to logical or
geometrical structures rich in meaning to us. It is thus that certain recent incompleteness results
point out a shift between formal principles of proof and principles of geometric construction (see
Longo [1999a and b, 2001a]). Every analysis of proofs has well to deal with computations, but it
also  needs  to  be  reorganised  around  a  new  unity  between  formal  symbols  and  meaningful
structures, where the organisation of space and time, with their symmetries, connectivity etc. give
meaning, allow and structure the proof itself (see Longo [2001a and b] and Girard's  program,
Girard [1997, 2001]).29
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